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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
A jury found Brett Scovill guilty of battery on a health care worker and he raises two
substantive issues on appeal. 1 First, Mr. Scovill asserts the district court abused its discretion by
precluding him from presenting evidence of his mental condition at the time of the incident, as
such evidence was relevant to an element of the crime charged, and thus was an issue of
consequence the jury was required to determine. Second, Mr. Scovill asserts the district court
abused its discretion when it declined to strike Mr. Albright's claim that Mr. Scovill struck him
prior to Mr. Albright taking Mr. Scovill to the ground, as a sanction for the State's failure to
disclose this new version of events prior to trial.
In response, the State makes a variety of arguments generally denying any error in the
district court's decisions, while proffering inapplicable standards of review. (Resp. Br., pp.1122.) Mr. Scovill addresses the State's arguments below.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Scovill's Appellant's Brief, and are repeated herein only where necessary to address the
State's arguments.

1

Mr. Scovill has also asserted a cumulative error claim.

1

ISSUES
I.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by precluding Mr. Scovill from presenting
evidence ofhis mental state at the time of the alleged incident?

II.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by failing to strike Mr. Albright's testimony that
Mr. Scovill made contact with him before he took Mr. Scovill to the ground, as a sanction
for the State's failure to disclose this assertion prior to trial?

III

Did the accumulation of errors, even if individually harmless, deprive Mr. Scovill of his
Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial? 2

2

The State's cumulative error argument is unremarkable and is therefore not addressed in this
Reply Brief
2

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Precluding Mr. Scovill From Presenting Evidence
Of His Mental State At The Time Of The Alleged Incident
The State asks this Court to affirm the district court's ruling that evidence of
Mr. Scovill's mental state at the time of the incident was not relevant, asserting Mr. "Scovill has
failed to show that the district court erred because he has failed to demonstrate that any proffered
evidence of his mental state tended to disprove the general intent of battery." (Resp. Br., p.6.)
The State further suggests that such evidence would only be relevant if it tended to show that
Mr. Scovill's acts were "involuntary."

(Resp. Br., pp.11-13.)

The State's proffered

jurisprudence is inconsistent with the dictates ofldaho Rule of Evidence 401.
Evidence proffered by a defendant does not have to "disprove" the State's theory of the
case, nor does it have to show that a defendant's actions were "involuntary," in order to be
relevant. Instead, "relevant evidence" is "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence." I.R.E. 401 (2017) (emphasis added). In order to prove
that Mr. Scovill committed battery against a health care worker, the State was required to prove
that Mr. Scovill committed a battery. LC. § 18-915C. Idaho Code§ 18-903 defines "battery" as
follows:
(a) Willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of another; or
(b) Actual, intentional and unlawful touching or striking of another person against
the will of the other; or
(c) Unlawfully and intentionally causing bodily harm to an individual.
I.C. § 18-903 (emphasis added).

Thus, in order to be "relevant," evidence of Mr. Scovill's

mental state at the time of his interactions with Mr. Albright, merely had to make the

3

determination of whether he acted willfully or intentionally either more probable or less
probable. See I.R.E. 401; I.C. § 18-903. Such evidence did not have to either prove or disprove
anything. Mr. Scovill's proffered evidence meets the requirements ofl.R.E. 401.
The State contends that LC. § 18-207, which eliminates "mental condition" as an
affirmative defense under Idaho law, means that a defendant may present evidence of his mental
condition only in rare circumstances. (Resp. Br., pp.11-13.) This is incorrect. While LC. § 18207 places limits on when a defendant can present expert evidence on his mental condition,
nothing in the rule prevents a defendant from presenting evidence of the circumstances
surrounding his allegedly criminal actions. 3 See LC. § 18-207; see also LC. § 18-115 ("Intent or
intention is manifested by the commission of the acts and surrounding circumstances connected
with the offense."). Certainly, had there been evidence that Mr. Scovill had expressed a desire to
harm a health care worker prior to entering the ER, such evidence would be relevant because it
would make it more probable that Mr. Scovill acted with the requisite mental state for the crime
charged. The same is true for the evidence proffered by Mr. Scovill. Evidence that Mr. Scovill
was suffering from a mental health crisis prior to entering the ER was relevant, because it makes
it less probable that he acted with the requisite mental state for the crime charged. The State's
argument is without merit. 4

3

The State correctly notes that Mr. Scovill did not make an offer of proof related to any expert
testimony on his mental condition. (Resp. Br., p.12.) To be clear, Mr. Scovill asserts the district
court erred in denying his ability to present testimony from both his father and from himself
regarding his mental condition immediately prior to, and during the time of the incident, and
does not assert any error in the court precluding expert evidence on the subject.
4
In a footnote, the State contends that even if the evidence was relevant, the district court
properly excluded the evidence pursuant to I.RE. 403, relying upon arguments it made in the
district court. (Resp. Br., p.13, n.6 (citing 3/28/18 Tr., p.9, Ls.19-25; p.10, Ls.16-18).) The
State's un-briefed Rule 403 analysis cannot be a basis for affirming the district court, because the
district court itself did not engage in a Rule 403 analysis. See State v. Ruiz, 150 Idaho 469, 471
(2010).
4

Next, the State engages in a harmless error analysis, inapposite to Idaho law. It has long
been established under Idaho law that when a defendant objects to an error and shows that a
violation occurred, the State bears the burden of proving "beyond a reasonable doubt that the
error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained." State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209,
221 (2010) (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)); see also Arizona v.

Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 296 (1991). The question "is whether the jury actually rested its
verdict on evidence establishing the presumed fact beyond a reasonable doubt, independently of'
the inadmissible evidence. Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 404 (1991). "The inquiry, in other
words, is not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely
have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely

unattributable to the error." Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993) (emphasis added).
Rather than attempting to meet its burden of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
district court's decision to deprive the jury of evidence that Mr. Scovill suffered a mental health
crisis at the time of the incident did not contribute to the guilty verdict, the State offers a
different, inapplicable analysis. First, the State surmises that the jury was "likely aware of the
general circumstances surrounding" Mr. Scovill's trip to the ER, because Mr. Scovill testified
that he had "gone to the hospital for a reason. I didn't go to McDonald's." (Resp. Br., pp.14-15.)
But the State's theory that the jury might guess why Mr. Scovill went to the ER, is no substitute
for evidence of the actual reason Mr. Scovill went to the ER - he was suffering a mental health
crisis. There is a mountain of difference between evidence that Mr. Scovill went to the ER
because he was suffering from a mental break, and evidence he went to the ER for some
unnamed reason that did not include a desire for a Big Mac and fries.

5

Furthermore, the State attempts to shift its burden of persuasion to Mr. Scovill, arguing
that there was nothing in Van Scovill's proffered testimony "that would have resulted in an
acquittal if admitted at trial, in light of the evidence of guilt set forth by the State." (Resp.
Br., p.15.) Again, this is not the proper analysis. The question is not whether the precluded
evidence would have resulted in an acquittal- the question is whether the district court's error in
precluding the evidence contributed to the verdict. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 221. The standard
the State advocates is more akin to the harmless error standard applied under the Perry
fundamental error standard, i.e., where the defendant shows that an unobjected to violation of his
constitutional rights occurred, which is clear and obvious from the record, the defendant must
show the error "actually affected the outcome of the trial proceedings," in order to get relief.
State v. Miller, 165 Idaho 115, _, 443 P.3d 129, 133-34 (2019) (citing Perry, 150 Idaho at

226).) The error in this case was preserved by a timely objection; thus, the State's analysis is
inapplicable.
The district court deprived the jury the ability to consider evidence of Mr. Scovill's
mental condition when determining whether the State had proven, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that Mr. Scovill acted with the requisite mental state to commit a battery. The State has failed to
prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the district court's erroneous ruling did not contribute to
the verdict.

6

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Failing To Strike Mr. Albright's Testimony That
Mr. Scovill Made Contact With Him Before He Took Mr. Scovill To The Ground, As A
Sanction For The State's Failure To Disclose This Assertion Prior To Trial
During the preliminary hearing, Mr. Albright testified that "when [Mr. Scovill] raised his
arm and stepped towards me, I wrapped him up around the torso and the head with my arms and
my upper body and took him to the ground." (Tr. Prelim, p.10, Ls.9-12.) He admitted that he
attacked Mr. Scovill first: "I don't have to wait to be punched before I can take use force - or
use use of force."

(Tr. Prelim, p.19, L.23 - p.20, L.1.) At trial, Mr. Albright's testimony

changed: "I was still moving forward. Mr. Scovill came and hit me in the chest with his upper
torso. I wrapped him up." (Tr. 4/24/18, p.181, Ls.10-12 (emphasis added).) The State did not
disclose this change in story prior to trial, and Mr. Scovill moved the district court to strike the
portion of Mr. Albright's testimony where he claimed that Mr. Scovill struck him in the chest,
prior to him contacting Mr. Scovill. (Tr. 4/24/18, p.196, L.17 - p.198, L.1.) The district court
found that "technically," the State's failure to disclose Mr. Albright's new version of events to
the defense prior to trial, was a discovery violation. (Tr. 4/24/18, p.198, L.11 - p.199, L.11.)
Despite the district court's finding, the State first asserts that there was no discovery violation.
(Resp. Br., pp.17-21.) The State's argument is without merit.
The State claims that Mr. Scovill never established what statements Mr. Albright made to
the prosecutor in their undisclosed pre-trial meeting, in an apparent attempt to absolve the
prosecutor of its failure to comply with the State's discovery obligations. (Resp. Br., p.20.) To
be clear, Mr. Albright admitted that he spoke with the prosecutor about his testimony after the
preliminary hearing, but before trial, that his "memories and recollection" differed from his
preliminary hearing testimony, and they were in fact "strengthened in [his] conversations with

7

the prosecutor." (Tr. 4/24/18, p.160, L.12 -p.163, L.7.) The prosecutor then acknowledged that
she only disclosed Mr. Albright's initial statement and did not disclose that she met with
Mr. Albright prior to trial, let alone what was discussed during the meeting. (Tr 4/24/18., p.163,
L.9 - p.164, L.4.) Notably, the prosecutor did not claim that Mr. Albright's proffered trial
testimony was a surprise to her; instead, she asserted that she did not believe Mr. Albright's
proffered testimony differed from what he had originally provided. (Tr. 4/24/18, p.163, Ls.918.) Eventually, the district court found that Mr. Albright's testimony did, in fact, differ from his
preliminary hearing testimony.

(Tr. 4/24/18, p.198, Ls.2-20.)

The State's argument that

Mr. Scovill failed to establish a discovery violation because he failed to establish what
Mr. Albright told the prosecutor during their post-prelim, pre-trial conference, is erroneous.
Additionally, the State appears to assert that the prosecutor was not required to disclose
the change in Mr. Albright' s testimony because it was evidence that could be used for
impeachment, suggesting that prosecutors are not required to disclose impeachment evidence.
(Resp. Br., pp.19-20 ("While such differences in testimony can provide grounds for
impeachment, they do not alone demonstrate a discovery violation").) This is wrong for two
reasons.

First, Mr. Albright's change in story is not merely impeaching.

Mr. Albright's

previously undisclosed testimony goes directly to an element of the offense - that Mr. Scovill
committed a battery by striking him in the chest - an element unsupported by Mr. Albright's
preliminary hearing testimony alone.

(Compare Tr. Prelim., p.19, L.23 - p.20, L.1 with

Tr. 4/24/18, p.181, Ls.10-12.) Furthermore, even if the evidence was merely impeaching, the
prosecutor was still required to disclose it. Idaho Criminal Rule 16(b)(6) requires the State to
disclose "the statements made by the prosecution witnesses or prospective prosecution witnesses

8

to the prosecuting attorney . . . ." Rule 16 does not distinguish between impeaching and nonimpeaching statements. The State's argument is without merit.
The State also fails to acknowledge the standard this Court must employ when reviewing
the district court's decision not to impose sanctions. The State asserts that Mr. Scovill failed to
show the district court abused its discretion because he "did not attempt to argue how any lack of
disclosure 'hampered his ability to meet the evidence at trial, had a deleterious effect on his trial
strategy, or ... deprived him of the opportunity to raise a valid challenge to the admissibility of
evidence."' (Resp. Br., p.21 (quoting State v. Allen, 145 Idaho, 183, 186 (Ct. App. 2008).) The
State further asserts that there is no "indication in the record that the prosecutor intended any
discovery violation, which limits the 'culpability of the disobedient power' and the need to
'punish misconduct."' Id. (quoting State v. Wilson, 158 Idaho 585, 588 (Ct. App. 2015).) The
State's reliance upon these authorities is misplaced.
The decision on what, if any, sanction should be imposed for the State's discovery
violation, is left to the sound discretion of district court. State v. Montgomery, 163 Idaho 40, 45
(2017).

Idaho appellate courts review such decisions for an abuse of discretion.

Id.

The

standards set forth in Allen and Wilson relied upon by the State, describe some of the legal
principles the district court is supposed to apply when determining whether or not to exercise its
discretion to impose a sanction for a discovery violation. However, the question for the appellate
Court is whether the district court abused its discretion based upon the factors the district court
actually considered. In reviewing a district court's discretionary determination, appellate Courts

considers four factors:
Whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2)
acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the
legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached
its decision by the exercise of reason.

9

Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018).

The district court did not consider the factors the State now relies upon to justify the
district court's decision; instead, the district court held that Mr. Albright's testimony does not
make any difference because "the video speaks for itself"

(Tr. 4/24/18, p.198, Ls.2-20.)

Mr. Scovill asserts that the district court abused its discretion because it did not reach its decision
through an exercise of reason because, as the State acknowledges (Resp. Br., p.19, n.8), the
video does not speak for itself - it does not show whether Mr. Scovill made contact with
Mr. Albright, prior to Mr. Albright taking him to the ground. (Ex. I: 09: 13-09:20.) Essentially,
the State is asking this Court to conduct its own de novo analysis, rather than review the
discretionary decision the district court actually made. This Court should not oblige the State's
request. 5
Finally, the State has failed to argue, let alone prove beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
district court's failure to strike Mr. Albright's testimony that Mr. Scovill struck him first was
harmless. (See generally Resp. Br.) Therefore, if this Court finds error in the district court's
decision, it must vacate Mr. Scovill's conviction. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 221; State v. Almaraz,
154 Idaho 584, 598-99 (2011).

5

To the extent this Court considers the standards announced in Allen and Wilson and the cases
cited therein, it should find the district court additionally abused its discretion by failing to apply
these applicable legal standards when exercising its discretion. See Lunneborg, 163 Idaho at
863.
10

CONCLUSION
Mr. Scovill respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction for battery against a
health care worker.
DATED this 24 th day of March, 2020.

Isl Jason C. Pinder
JASON C. PINTLER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 24 th day of March, 2020, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF, to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

Isl Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
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